BOOK REVIEW

Cyberprotest : Environmental Activism Online : Jenny Pickerill ; Manchester University Press; Rs. 950

CYBERSPACE : A site and form of resistance

‘A riot from Cyberspace’ , ‘Internet message sets off a rampage’, ‘Virtual Chaos baffles Police’ etc... have become media coverage headings for many protests as in from the 1999 ‘Carnival Against Capitalism’ in London, to today’s ‘Jasmine Revolution’.

Cyberprotests are defined by the very difference from normal wars et all by its use of internet, which enables activists to plan, plot and coordinate actions with low costs, anonymity (from Police detection) and speed. There are no clear leaders, spokesperson or discernable plans, but it is apparently still able to reach a wider ‘audience of potential participants’ than ever before and spark a rampage.

The book deals with the environmental aspect of CMC’s (Computer Mediated Communication), aiming three specific tenets: First, to evaluate how CMC provides opportunities for political expression and mobilisation; Secondly, the challenges what technology poses on activism, and finally, to elucidate influence of CMC on campaign strategies and consequently on government, business and regulatory responses to environmental activism.

Political Aspects: Residing within, Impacting and Constituting Cyberspace

‘Importance of on-line interactions is examined for its off-line implications.’

What cyberspace has made easier is the creation of societies, which is what precisely a social movement needs. A social movement being a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and organisations, boundaries of which are determined by the collective identity shared by those involved, whose ‘actors are involved in political and cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change either at systematic or non-systematic level’.

As time is passing, ‘new’ manifestations among the ‘old’ social movement theories have grown. This trend – the New Social Movements (NSM) approach – is no longer centred around the conflict over capitalism, the theory tries to relate social movements to large scale structural and cultural changes within the so-called ‘information age’.

Examination of CMC’s by activists has divided it into the dichotomy of being a utopian or dystopian. The former suggests it as all solution for all ethical, economic or political problems in the society. While, latter often over predicts the negative consequences of technology use.

Also, it has been very interestingly compared with a rhizome, with no definite beginning or end and growing in all directions. So, as the proliferation of open source software challenges the government’s ability to regulate such CMC use, ways are being architected for its better structuring and control.

In the political space, CMC’s stand more than the extension of any other existing media. The very key factors being: low cost, easy editorial control, and an international audience.

Networking here is done by recruiting members through existing social networks or moral shocks. Though the strength of these virtual communities remains contested, the smaller groups get to voice their opinions too and trigger wider mobilisation.

Moreover, media coverage is very often represented without any explanation, and only the extreme acts are considered, while moderate actions are considered not newsworthy. While, CMC’s enable self-representation and provide as much content and details as they wish.

Any emerging resistance here emerges with symptoms of hacking, piracy, self- managed networks, and so on. The movement intellectuals, i.e. ones with new ideas and critique of the modern world, appreciate CMC’s the most, as it feature their ideas to be distributed freely and stimulate protest.

Hence actually the CMC’s could be thought ideally as participatory democratic in politics.

Tensions of techno-environmentalism

This topic mainly deals with: the appraisal of technology, changing views towards CMC’s because of its environmental consequences, paradox of the techno-CMC issue, and consequences of its negotiation.

The popular critique stating CMC’s as “Environmentally Destructive Technology” by the environmentalists, is divided to two categories with time: the extreme eco-radicals, i.e. the ones who oppose all forms of modern technology, and the majority, who advocate the use of ‘intermediate, appropriate and democratically owned technology’, and are opposed to advanced technology only. And practically speaking, in today’s world, if someone says “We are eco, we’re not going to use computers”, then no one will get their message, so it’s better to say that “think about the consequences of everything you do including computers,” as it fulfils the mission.

A certain sector of environmentalists even criticise the use of alternative technology as being a part in the ‘technological fix’, and view it as mere complement for large scale capitalistic development, becoming part of problem, rather than solution.

Technology has been divided into two kinds: the democratic sort (decentralised and active), and one way communication (centralised and passive).

Another doubt about computers is further expressed by the threat of ‘virtual interactions’ taking precedence over the ‘personal interaction’ space.

Now stating the paradox: When environmentalists do critique CMC’s, it is quite often not from the perspective of the environment, but about issues of access or usefulness. A recent survey amongst the GSN when asked about potential environmental consequences by technology responded as follows: 10% - Very; 50% - mildly; 20% - Not at all; and others – Not sure. It is mostly compared to the elitist group because of its oppressive and environmentally damaging nature. Also, its need for expensive equipments and technical know-how bring up its elitist nature.

Now coming to the consequences of the negotiations with technology, it includes social concern of MNC globalisation and hence distribution of labour (at low wages in developing nations) and poorer working conditions, and environmental concern includes: toxic gas discharges, air pollution, groundwater contamination, CFC production, etc. Also due to unduly maintained manufacturing sites, workers suffer with health hazard as of exposure to solvents, acids, caustic substances, emulsions, etc. Moreover the amount of power needed to keep the telecommunication infrastructure ongoing, and the harmful social and health aspect of spending hours in front of the computer screen. Plus, the throw-away aspect of computers adds to the waste landfill pressures.

But then as one says every coin has two sides to look at, environmentalists say rather than thinking of the impossible, of exchanging the history of evolution of computers, or shunting oneself off to stop being part of the problem, which neither reduces the problem nor leads to any solution. One needs to adapt or adjust to the changes. So, the environmentalist primitive hippies now themselves say that it is a current transitory usage. Advancing with the argument of ‘fighting fire with fire’, they say that if they have to be up against the capitalist world of corporations, they need to be tooled up as much as them or better. So the aim they say is “The day we get what we want, the WINDOW goes out of the WINDOW”.

Anyways, looking this way also shows that CMC’s have decreased environmental effects of other activities and had energy and resource savings. Paper use has decreased significantly. Many activists also argue that CMC’s are not significant enough to be a priority. Many other issues like farming etc. may need to be addressed first. Moreover growing trends of reusing, recycling and renewable power sources is mitigating the environmental effects even further.

Cyberprotests: new politics of protest

The internet has caused a transformation in the socio-political game. The CMC’s have become indispensible mainly because of factors of mobilisation around cultural values, non-hierarchical organisation, and rooting activists at local and global levels.

The current advancing ‘technopolitics’ requires negotiations, as it has constraints (logistical and legal).

The six important consequences of CMC’s are:

· Modifying, not rejecting technology-triggering to on-line and off-line changes at some time intervals is necessary to break the stereotype, to make it more appealing to the populus.

· Extending Control- remove reliance upon large NGO’s for funds, or media for coverage, to allow grassroot groups to maintain control over the operations

· Decreasing Containability- Has become harder to locate key individuals or assets

· Strengthening Cohesion- interlinking people at a global level

· Swarming Opponents- adds up to activists ability of physical tactics and electronic attacks

· Rapid Interaction- CMC’s have facilitated the dynamism of movement, made it more fast, spontaneous and less confinable by the authorities

The four important challenges for CMC activists include: it is a site of political and cultural struggle; may only be a temporary space of resistance; off-line, mortal and earth-bound life and movements may take a toll; and, it has disproportionately benefitted small, grassroot groups which often suffer from lack of resources. Hence, there is a desire to create order, security and sameness in the system. Moreover, the ‘cracks that appear in the cyberspace’ are being filled soon enough these days by the government, providing a threat to the key cyber activists.

The term ‘virtual sit-in’ is used to refer to electronic civil disobedience. Similar to road marches, it provides space for discussions, but does not provide a solution.

The situation at the activists end now leads to a demand of better Open Source Software, more formal, bureaucratic and flexible organisation, and increase knowledge for further tactical use of new technologies.

Though the book deals with protests and situations in the British Environment, it can be extended to most parts of the world, varying at different paces in different places.

BOOK REVIEW

BOOK REVIEW OF                 CYBERPROTEST: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM                     ONLINE
JENNY PICKERILL, 2003 MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS COST: Rs.950

You must be the change you wish to see in the world!!! Start to weave a GREEN WEB!!!

Protest movements are continuously appropriating new technologies. Technology is of our own making and the use to which we put it is a result of social processes. The telephone, still camera, video camera, mobile phone, and fax machine have all been utilised. In many ways Computer Mediated Communications (CMC) is simply one more addition to this list.

The question at the crux of this book, is whether the ways in which CMC is being utilised enables fundamental changes in the way environmentalists organise themselves, the tactics they develop and even the influence and success they can achieve.

The book is structured around the analysis of various implications. Each chapter explores one of the five broad themes: the paradox of technology use, access to CMC, mobilisation through CMC, electronic tactics and on-line surveillance and counterstrategies.

This book’s objective is to examine:

·         Relationship between the strategies of environmental activism movements in Britain and their use of CMC. The activists were apparently able to reach a wider audience of potential participants than ever before and thus able to spark a rampage.

·         CMC use on different implications for established environmental lobbying organisations as opposed to the non-hierarchical fluid networks of direct action groups.

·         How activists resolved the tensions of using a potentially environmentally damaging technology.

·         Challenges the technology poses for activism.

·         CMC influence on campaign strategies and consequently on business, government and regulatory responses to environmental activism.

·         The ways in which environmental activists overcome the barriers and utilise these opportunities illustrates the complex ways in which cyberspace is used as  resistance.

The significance of CMC:

·         It aids the development of a radical democratic techno-politics that will use new technologies to advance the interests of oppositional social groups.

·         It creates awareness of various movements that have been excluded from mainstream media and political debate.

·         It increases speed in terms of response, information gathering and networking ability to Social Movement Organisations, which in turn might alter their organisational capabilities.

·         It could be used as a virtual public sphere to organise protests by involving vast number of other individuals to distribute their ideas and critique existing intellectuals for the movement to move further towards participatory democracy.

·         It affects the strength of movement networks in that communication becomes simultaneously both easier and more fragmented by increasing communication between the different types of groups.

The concept of an environmental activist…...

The definition of environmental activist is given quite broadly within this book. The term represents far more than the limited stereotype which denotes short term physical action. An activist is one who takes any form of action, ranging from direct physical acts to minute lifestyle adjustments, and also includes those who simply voice their concern or opinions through letter writing or discussion. Activism is not something that can be clearly bounded, marked as separate from everyday life.

Paradox of technology use:

‘Technology itself is not intrinsically bad but that it is the way that you use technology that counts’.

Environmental activists view and navigate and examine the consequences of this negotiation of techno-environmentalism. They can mitigate the environmental effects of computer by reusing and recycling components, reducing the energy used by their computers and by using renewable energy sources. Many can sought to minimise their consumption of hardware by reusing existing components to construct or upgrade existing machines, or by recycling their disused equipment.

Access to CMC:

‘The constraints to cyber-activism are largely those that hobble other political involvement’.

CMC enables an international audience to be reached, at relatively low cost and at speed activists can co-ordinate global wide protests or share ideas and solutions with international activists. Access to CMC is shaped by several constraining factors: finance, location and office space, technical skills and training, technical specifications and support, gender, class and ethnicity and language. Workshops can be used to share skills or individuals learn by example from others. The few highly technically skilled individuals at the forefront of innovative CMC can attempt at skill sharing.

Mobilisation through CMC:

‘Strengthen the ties that bind’.

The use of CMC is to mobilise participation and facilitate the networking of, environmental activism. This includes an examination of the impediments of using CMC for mobilisation and networking. Electronic publication can attract new audience. By simulating on-line debates people can become more involved in the campaign. Using CMC to raise the profile of their campaign activists can indirectly aid their attempts at mobilisation. If the website is made more interactive, people can participate by introducing new ideas.

Electronic Tactics:

‘It’s a bit of a game you’ve got to come up with some sort of stunt’.

 Environmentalists can extend their use of the technology to develop CMC as a tool of protest. This includes the use of CMC as a substitution for a reliance upon mainstream media, and thus for the production of a digital alternative media. Environmentalists can display information which counters opponent’s opinions, it is itself a tactical use of the technology. Emails can be used in the same way as letters or faxes for personal requests or as part of mass petitions.

On-line surveillance and counterstrategies:

‘Computerised electronic surveillance has ushered a whole new phase of domination’.

Environmental activists understand the threats due to on-line surveillance and the developed counterstrategies. The benefits of the publicity offered by CMC outweighed the inevitable loss of secrecy. The most secure form of communication is still the word of mouth… anything that should be kept a secret should not be done on the computer. Several multinationals prevent activists from making allegations by posting counter arguments online.

Why is the study of Social Movements important???

I agree with the author that it is necessary to explore in a little more depth what is meant by the use of social movement perspectives and then to outline their applicability and usefulness to understanding British environmental activism.

Social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups or organisations, the boundaries of which are determined by the collective identity shared by those involved or engaged in political or cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change either at the systematic or non-systemic level.

The three major trends of social movement: the collective behaviour perspective, resource mobilisation theory (RMT), and the political process perspective - provide frameworks for analysing different structural aspects of the old social movements.

The fourth trend the New Social Movements (NSM) approach contrasts with these earlier approaches by concentrating on the ‘why’ of collective action rather than upon the ‘how’. NSM theory tries to relate social movements to large-scale structural and cultural changes within the so-called ‘information age’. NSMs are concerned with adjusting the logic of the system.

Thus, CMC will serve to reproduce the political and social relations of capitalism. Inclusion of the importance of some aspects of technological development from the political economy perspective enables a clearer analysis of the political impacts upon cyberspace such as multinational ownership or government regulation of its uses. Furthermore, the way in which CMC is constructed is liable to have a significant influence upon the way in which it can be controlled.

Main questions asked:

Is the new technology of global communication changing the forms of the diffusion of collective challenges or only the speed of their transmission?

In the book author gives sociologist Manuel Castells’s answer. He asserts that the internet is indispensable to those social movements concerned with cultural values, organising in a non-hierarchical loose form and for those wishing to retain their local roots and yet act on a global level. In comparison to social movements, extensive and innovative use of CMC, Castells also illustrates the lack of interaction offered on-line by formal political parties. In all, he asserts that activists are able to benefit greatly from CMC use, despite cyberspace being a contested terrain by relatively levelling the ground of symbolic manipulation and by broadening the sources of communication, it does contribute to democratization.

‘Accessibility’ or ‘Innovation’?…. Which one is more important??

According to the author there should be a striking balance between accessibility and innovation. It is important to try and make the site obviously as interactive and as flash as possible but not to make the core ideas and the core content unobtainable, to make it as inclusive as possible on every browser and on every slowest machine. For example, the activist group McSpotlight sought to reduce the costs for its audience by enabling the site to be downloaded free of charge or viewed as a CD-ROM which enabled unlimited use, free of the constraints of continued Net access, line rentals and connection charges.

Where to now in the future???

It is pertinent to acknowledge that only the early stages of CMC use is a crucial period that determines future frameworks of technology use. CMC use will continue to evolve and be utilised by environmentalists, modifying and being modified by social processes. The new interactions triggered by CMC have significantly altered each of the environmental groups considered here, and are likely to aid new collaborations and the development of new forms of environmental protest, particularly internationally.

Although, this book will quickly become a historical account of CMC use, it is no less relevant for its time-specific context. The ability to examine these processes of negotiation around the use of CMC as the debates are occurring provides insight into the way in which CMC use has been practised in the twenty first century.

I conclude by saying that overall book gives a novelty about the use of CMC by environmentalists and its impact upon the forms and processes of various affiliated groups. British environmental activists are a diverse cohort composed of individuals and groups with diverging aims, ideologies and forms of organisation. These differences are exposed in their contrasting attitudes to and use of CMC. They are united, however, in their struggle to use CMC to their advantage and to continue their protest, activism, resistance and creation of positive alternatives through and in cyberspace. The environmental movement is particularly innovative, creative and skilful and this has been extended to its use of CMC.

D MOUNICA JYOTHI

CH10B039

BOOK REVIEW

BOOK REVIEW
DIGITAL ACTIVISM DECODED:THE NEW MECHANICS OF CHANGE
MARY C JOYCE(EDITOR)
It is the first book explicitly dedicated to digital activism, its editor Mary Joyce proudly says. In Digital Activism Decoded, 15 authors explore the intersection of activism and digital technology, in an attempt to map the field of digital activism in its entirety. From Mary's summary: The book begins with a section on Contexts, addressing not only the technology of network infrastructure, devices, and applications, but also the social, economic, and political environment in which digital activism occurs. An analysis of Practices follows, not in the usual format of case study analysis, but by presenting different ways of thinking about these practices. The section begins with a chapter on pre-digital social movement theory, while a second chapter takes the digital perspective of web ecology. Both constructive and destructive activism practices are discussed. The final section on Effects seeks to address the range of opinions on digital activism’s value.
It is a well written book on a relatively new topic which has generally been recognised to have played an important role in the arab spring but so far explored via ancedotes and circumstantial only,rather than on a theoretical framework.This book tries to build a common theoretic framework by including major articles on the use,applications,definitions and possible misuse of the digital media.

US foreign policy in the Middle East

What is the Jasmine Revolution?

It refers to the December-January mass uprising in Tunisia that overthrew president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 15.It was sparked off by the self-immolation of vegetable vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, when he was humiliated by a woman constable on December 17.It was christened the Jasmine Revoluion by the media in keeping with the geopolitical nomenclature of 'colour revolutions' .The movement grew over the issues of unemployment, food inflation, corruption, lack of freedom of speech and poor living conditions and overflowed into Egypt where it has been raging.

Tunisia: How the US got it wrong
The events in Tunisia again show how US foreign policy in the Middle East fails to fully understand the region. The US ambassador to Tunisia explains the North African country's ambivalent position in US foreign policy. Although a potential friend to America in the region, the country is troubled by nepotism, corruption, and the 'sclerotic' regime of ageing president Ben Ali. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
Recently in Doha, Secretary of State Clinton spoke of regimes whose "foundations are sinking into the sand and who will disappear unless "reform" occurs. Ironically, the same regimes who have been historically backed by the US.In Doha, Clinton poetically spoke of regimes whose "foundations are sinking into the sand" and who will, it is assumed, disappear unless "reform" occurs. The reality is that US foreign policy towards the Middle East and larger Muslim world is equally in danger of sinking into the sands if the President and his senior officials are not willing to get ahead of history's suddenly accelerating curve. It is the US and Europe, as much as the leaders of the region, who in Clinton's words are in need of "a real vision for that future."

Clinton was eloquent in her closing remarks at the Forum for the Future, where she declared,

"Let us face honestly that future. Let us discuss openly what needs to be done. Let us use this time to move beyond rhetoric, to put away plans that are timid and gradual, and make a commitment to keep this region moving in the right direction. People are looking for real leadership in the 21st century, and I think it can be provided, and I know that this is the moment to do so."
She couldn't be more right, but it will only happen if the United States, and not the Arab world's aging and autocratic leadership, takes her sage advice.
US embassy cables: Tunisia - a US foreign policy conundrumon
By many measures, Tunisia should be a close US ally. But it is not. While we share some key values and the country has a strong record on development, Tunisia has big problems. President Ben Ali is aging, his regime is sclerotic and there is no clear successor. Many Tunisians are frustrated by the lack of political freedom and angered by First Family corruption, high unemployment and regional inequities. Extremism poses a continuing threat. Compounding the problems, the GOT brooks no advice or criticism, whether domestic or international. Instead, it seeks to impose ever greater control, often using the police. The result: Tunisia is troubled and our relations are too.
In the past three years, US Mission Tunis has responded by offering greater cooperation where the Tunisians say they want it, but not shied from making plain the need for change. We have had some successes, notably in the commercial and military assistance areas. But we have also had failures. We have been blocked, in part, by a Foreign Ministry that seeks to control all our contacts in the government and many other organizations. Too often, the GOT prefers the illusion of engagement to the hard work of real cooperation. Major change in Tunisia will have to wait for Ben Ali's departure, but President Obama and his policies create opportunities now. What should we do to take advantage of them? We recommend:
-- keep a strong focus on democratic reform and respect for human rights, but shift the way we promote these goals; -- seek to engage the GOT in a dialogue on issues of mutual interest, including trade and investment, Middle East peace, and greater Maghreb integration; -- offer Tunisians (with an emphasis on youth) more English-language training, educational exchanges, and cultural programs; -- move our military assistance away from FMF, but look for new ways to build security and intelligence cooperation; and, -- increase high-level contacts but stress that deeper US cooperation depends on real Tunisian engagement.
Notwithstanding the frustrations of doing business here, we cannot write off Tunisia. We have too much at stake. We have an interest in preventing al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other extremist groups from establishing a foothold here. We have an interest in keeping the Tunisian military professional and neutral. We also have an interest in fostering greater political openness and respect for human rights. It is in our interest, too, to build prosperity and Tunisia's middle class, the underpinning for the country's long-term stability. Moreover, we need to increase mutual understanding to help repair the image of the United States and secure greater cooperation on our many regional challenges. The United States needs help in this region to promote our values and policies. Tunisia is one place where, in time, we might find it
While the United States and the international community should not directly intervene unless the military begins killing or arresting large numbers of people, there are a number of steps Obama could take immediately to ensure that this nascent democratic moment takes root and spreads across the region.

First, the President should not merely urge free and fair elections. He must publicly declare that the United States will not recognise, nor continue security or economic relations, with any government that is not democratically elected through international monitored elections. At the same time, he must freeze any assets of Tunisia's now ex-leadership and hold them until they can be reclaimed by the Tunisian people.

Second, he should declare that the young people of Tunisia have shown the example for the rest of the Arab world, and offer his support for a "Jasmin Spring" across the Arab world. Obama should demand that every country in the region free all political prisoners, end all forms of censorship and political repression, and fully follow international law in the way they treat their citizens or the people's under their jurisdictions.

Furthermore, the President should call on every country in the region to move towards free, fair, and internationally monitored elections within a specified time or risk facing a similar cut-off of ties, aid and cooperation. Such demands must be made together with America's reluctant European allies.

Of course, such a call would apply to Israel as much as to Egypt, to Morocco as well as to Saudi Arabia. There would be one standard for every country from the Atlantic to the Indian ocean, and the US would pledge to stand with all people working to bring real democracy, freedom and development to their peoples and countries and to oppose all governments that stand in their way.

Imagine what would happen to America's image in the Muslim world if the President took such a stand? Imagine what would happen to al Qaeda's recruitment levels if he adopted such a policy (in fact, al Qaeda has been equally behind the 8-ball, as it was only Friday that the leaders of the movement's so-called Maghrebian wing declared their support for the protests in Tunisia and Algeria).

Imagine how hard it would be for so-called "supporters" of Israel to attack the President for finally putting some teeth behind his criticism of Israeli policy (which Clinton in Doha incredulously said the US could do nothing to stop) if he could reply that he was only holding Israel to the same standard as everyone else and that his policies were actually protecting America's core interests and security?

Is Revolution contagious?

The political ferment unleashed by the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia (December 17, 2010–January 14, 2011) and the Nile Revolution in Egypt (January 25, 2011–February 11, 2011) has been unprecedented and breathtaking. Never before has popular protest brought down an authoritarian regime in the Arab world. And never had anyone anticipated the speed with which such deeply entrenched regimes might be overthrown. The quick succession of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia by the fall of Mubarak in Egypt raised the hope among Arab political activists that a contagious wave of revolution might soon usher in democratic transition throughout the Middle East. But close analysis of these two cases suggests a different scenario. This Brief argues that these two uprisings were successful, thanks to a particular set of conditions that are not easy to replicate in the Arab world as a whole. Furthermore, transition to democracy does not necessarily come after the end of dictatorship. By analyzing the dynamics of these two revolutions and their immediate aftermath in both countries, we will gain leverage on the possibilities and limitations of revolutionary replication and democratic transition elsewhere in the region.

The Jasmine and Nile revolutions began with the successful mobilization of popular protest. But such mobilization poses a puzzle. How do we explain the sudden willingness of thousands of ordinary citizens to join in protests after years of political lethargy? Many have argued that a triad of grievances involving repression, corruption, and economic hardship motivated the protesters. The regimes of both Ben Ali and Mubarak were renowned for harassing opposition figures, suppressing political activism and civil liberties, and opposing any sort of electoral reform that might have fostered political change. The ruling elite in both countries routinely engaged in bribery, kickbacks, and cronyism, cavalierly flouting the law to indulge their taste for extravagantly conspicuous consumption. And economic hardship remained a reality for most citizens in both countries. In Tunisia this manifested itself in kleptocracyextraordinarily high unemployment levels that hovered around 15 percent for the country as a whole but exceeded 30 percent for young people between the ages of 15 and 29 and surpassed a whopping 46 percent among college-educated youth. In Egypt, economic hardship manifested itself in terms of punishingly high rates of poverty: According to the World Bank, 40 percent of the Egyptian population lives below the poverty line of $2 a day.

Without doubt these grievances were serious. But grievances alone do not suffice to explain mass mobilization, because as vexing as these ills were, they had plagued both countries for decades. Yet never before had they sparked popular protest in any sustained way. Furthermore, the same three grievances have long afflicted almost every country in the region, often to a degree that dwarfed the experience of Tunisia (though perhaps less so Egypt). The grinding poverty found in Yemen, food crisis in Ethiopia and the outsized kleptocracy found in Saudi Arabia far eclipsed Tunisia’s difficulties. If magnitude of grievance were the sole factor determining the likelihood of protest, Tunisia would have been the least likely site for launching this sudden wave of mobilization.

So why did protest take off in Tunisia and Egypt, and why now? I feel that four factors proved essential to this process: an emotional trigger, a sense of impunity, a professional military, and new social media.

An Emotional Trigger

As we know that the average person doesn’t take to the streets as a consequence of carefully thought-through policy analysis or deeply held ideological convictions. Rather, people take to the streets in large numbers when they feel compelled by some strong emotion, such as anger, fear, or euphoria. In Tunisia, the emotional trigger was outrage. In Egypt, outrage also played a role in triggering mobilization, but so did the positive emotion of euphoria. In both cases, emotional triggers served as the spark that lit the underlying tinder of long-term economic and political grievances.

In the Tunisian case, two incidents in particular sparked the outrage that brought people out into the streets in December and January. The first was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the fruit vendor who set himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid after city officials seized his means of livelihood, publicly humiliated him, and cavalierly ignored his quest for restitution. Bouazizi’s experience exemplified the humiliating disrespect and disregard so many Tunisians had felt at the hands of the state. In addition, his experience of joblessness and his reduction to unlicensed street vending captured the economic hopelessness many young Tunisians felt. Bouazizi’s plight resonated broadly in Tunisian society and the regime’s culpability in his condition ignited the public’s fury.

The second factor that sparked popular outrage in Tunisia was the fact that the regime resorted to lethal force to put down the demonstrations that had begun in December. It is one thing for the state to repress protesters with tear gas and billy clubs. It is another thing to post snipers on building rooftops to shoot to kill their fellow citizens. By mid-January, reports were that Tunisian security forces had killed seventy-eight people. We know about these official reports. Actually many more people might have been killed. This resort to lethal force further stoked outrage in Tunisian society.

In Egypt, outrage was sparked by a number of circumstances: the regime’s brutal murder of rights activist Khaled Said, widely publicized on Facebook; the stolen elections of November 2010, wherein opposition forces were denied any credible representation; and the midwinter spike in the price of basic food commodities, which hammered Egypt’s poor. But even more than outrage, the most proximate emotional trigger that brought people out into the streets in Egypt was a positive emotion: euphoria! The rapid fall of the dictator in Tunisia gave Egyptians the feeling that suddenly the impossible was possible. Perhaps the old autocrats could be dislodged, if only the people stood together. The joy and hope generated by the Tunisian example proved as important as any other emotional trigger in motivating people to join in the protests in Egypt.

Impunity and the Calculation of Risk

Participation in mass protest is to some degree a matter of cost-benefit calculation. Aside from die-hard activists, most people are reluctant to participate in protests if they think it likely that they will get hurt or killed in the process of participating. However, if people are persuaded that the costs of participation are not grave they will be more likely to join in. This is why one often sees a cascade effect in such protests: Once a demonstration reaches a certain size, it tends to snowball. Why? Simply because the more people join in a protest, the lower the chance of any given individual’s getting hurt. There is safety in numbers. Thus, rational calculation of risk determines, to some degree, when people will mobilize.

In Tunisia, rational calculation of risk led people to join the demonstrations in large numbers once one crucial fact became clear: that the military would not shoot. Once people became persuaded that the military was hesitating in its willingness to back the regime, the risk of protesting declined precipitously: People came to believe that they could protest with impunity. That decreased sense of threat fueled massive participation in the protests. People responded in huge numbers to the call to join the demonstrations in downtown Tunis. By January 14, more than 10,000 people had massed on Avenue Habib Bourguiba—numbers that no police force alone could contain. Consequently, when the military informed Ben Ali they would not step in to defend him from the crowds, the president had no choice but to flee.

A somewhat similar scenario played out in Egypt. Early on, the Egyptian military signaled that it would not shoot on the crowds. At first, the military relied on tear gas and water cannons in an attempt to disperse the protesters. But by January 29 it was evident that the military had decided to focus on protecting government buildings rather than intervening against the demonstrators. On January 31 a military spokesman explicitly declared on state TV that “the military understood the legitimacy of the protesters’ demands” and that “the armed forces will not resort to force against our great people.” Consequently, aside from two days during the first week of protests, when regime-sponsored thugs violently assaulted demonstrators, a sense of impunity developed. People brought their children to witness the historic moment. The number of people gathering in the public squares swelled.

Military Professionalism

The military’s decision to defect is pivotal to explaining the snowballing of mass protest as well as the dictator’s obligation to flee. This raises the larger question of when the military will defect. The answer lies in the character of the military and whether it is institutionally invested in the survival of the ruler. If the military is professional, if it is not linked by blood or kinship to the ruler, if it is not enmeshed in crony-capitalist links with the regime, it will be more likely to abandon a ruler under challenge. The military will seek to defend its interests as an institution, and this might be wholly compatible with holding its fire, siding with protesters, and ushering in regime change. This is because a directive to fire on civilians is institutionally costly to the military. Such a directive is at odds with the military’s institutional imperative to defend the nation. Obeying it might seriously compromise the military’s legitimacy and internal discipline, and might encourage the rank and file to desert (as was the case in the Iranian Revolution of 1979). Faced with these potential costs, the military may decide that it is in its institutional interest to hold its fire.

This was precisely what happened in Tunisia. In contrast to most of its neighbors, Tunisia long boasted a military that was both professional and historically removed from politics. The country’s founding father, Habib Bourguiba, always kept the military small and far from power. This was evidenced by the fact that until 1987, the fateful year in which Ben Ali was appointed by Bourguiba to head the Ministry of Interior, no military officer had ever served as a minister in Tunisia. Interestingly, even after Ben Ali came to power, the new president persisted in keeping the military at arm’s length. He never shared with it the spoils of power, nor did he favor it with special economic treatment. In this way, the military in Tunisia was not patrimonially linked to the regime nor was it institutionally invested in Ben Ali’s survival. When the president instructed the military to shoot (which would likely have set off a delegitimizing massacre), the military was able to instead imagine sending Ben Ali packing. So it refused. Had the military not taken this stand, Tunisia’s popular uprising would likely not have resulted in regime change. But once the military chose to abandon the regime, Ben Ali had no choice but to flee.

In the case of Egypt, the situation was a bit more complicated. Egypt’s military had a strong reputation for professionalism (bolstered by its ties with the U.S. military, and by the widespread national legitimacy it enjoyed), and its leadership was not linked by blood or marriage to the family of Hosni Mubarak. As such it could entertain defecting from an alliance with the autocrat. At the same time, Egypt’s military had long participated in the governing of the country and had strong crony-capitalist links with the regime. As a result, it was unclear which way the military would lean. In the end, professionalism and popular legitimacy won out over investment in Mubarak’s survival. The military declared its allegiance to the youth of Egypt.

Social Media as Enabler

Finally, one other factor that must be highlighted to explain the timing and success of the popular uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt is the role of social media. In prior years, mobilization of political protest had been undermined by two factors: societal collusion and state repression. Many Egyptians and Tunisians willingly bought into the “authoritarian bargain” offered by the regime in power. They exchanged political dormancy for stability (as well as economic growth, in the Tunisian case, that was the envy of much of the region). But even those citizens who rejected the authoritarian bargain found their capacity to organize politically blocked: The Tunisian and Egyptian regimes did everything in their power to suppress opposition and to atomize society. Political activists were arrested and brutalized; public gatherings were controlled when not forbidden; speech was censored; and publications (especially in Tunisia) were often shut down. Here is where social media come in. New social media (and I include under this rubric Facebook, Twitter, You Tube, and cell phones with video feed capacity) enabled the mobilization of collective action in ways that were heretofore impossible in repressive settings. Social media provided a platform for conveying the stories and symbols that fueled mass participation in protest. The Facebook pages devoted to Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation and Khaled Said’s brutalization along with the video feeds of early rounds of demonstrations were crucial prods. Both egged others on to join the wave of protest and as a result vastly increased the level of participation.

Social media provided the means for coordinating and synchronizing the actions of thousands of people, thereby making mass gatherings possible even in the absence of any formal organizational infrastructure. Most important, the anonymity and spontaneity of social media enabled them to escape the control and repression of the authoritarian state. More than any other factor, new social media explain why this wave of protest was possible now.

Revolutionary Replication

Turning to the question of the possibility of replication of these revolutions in other countries in the region, we must determine whether the conditions that enabled the success of the Jasmine and Nile Revolutions are likely to be found in other Middle Eastern and North African countries. Do the citizens in these countries hold deep-seated grievances against their regimes? Are the emotional triggers present that are likely to bring people out into the streets? Is the military sufficiently professional and sufficiently uninvested in the regime to refuse a directive to shoot on protesters—and will that bring about the sense of impunity so essential to the snowballing of protest, thereby compelling the undefended autocrat to flee? And is there sufficient access to social media to evade state repression during the mobilization of protest?

Replication of these conditions is not easy. Deep-seated political and economic grievances are nearly omnipresent in the region, and the primary complaints of most citizens in neighbouring countries echo those found in Tunisia. But as we noted earlier, grievances alone are not sufficient to ignite mass protest. What about the presence of outrage or some other emotional trigger to propel people into the streets? This is more complicated. Clearly there is a great deal of popular anger directed at the regimes in many Middle East and North African countries. The problem is that in a good number of these countries, that anger is counterbalanced by some grudging support for, or even investment in, the regime. Take, for example, the case of Syria, a country deeply riven by sectarian cleavage. Many in Syrian society revile the authoritarian regime led by the Assad family. But they are also terrified that should the regime fall, it will take the lid off a boiling cauldron of sectarian hatred, and Syria might descend into civil war in the manner of Lebanon. That is, many Syrians hate the regime, but they fear sectarian chaos even more—thereby dousing popular outrage to some degree.

Similarly, consider Saudi Arabia. This is a country in which corruption and cronyism are present in epic proportions—but the regime has always made it a point to spread the wealth around society and broadly distribute patronage. As a result, a fair number of people are invested in the regime’s survival. Or take the case of Algeria. Many in Algerian society are angry at the regime’s repressiveness, as well as at the persistence of economic hardship. But after a decade of civil war that saw over 150,000 people killed during the 1990s, Algerians are exhausted and desperate for political stability. They are grudgingly invested in the regime—and decidedly unenthusiastic about the commotion that typically accompanies revolution.

The point is that in many Middle Eastern North African countries, for reasons specific to the conditions of each country, there are sizeable portions of society who remain invested in the regime in power. You don’t generally find the same sweeping consensus of opposition that was present in Tunisia, and this works to diminish popular outrage. It puts a dent in the contagion of mobilization against the regime, leaving the underlying sense of grievance to smoulder rather than become enflamed.

Of course, as we saw in the Egyptian case, outrage is not the only emotional trigger that can propel people into the streets. Positive emotions can prove just as powerful motivators as negative ones. There is no explaining the rush in popular mobilization in Egypt without reference to the sense of optimism and possibility generated by the Tunisian precedent. But the power of the Tunisian example should not be overestimated. In the interim there have been unsuccessful uprisings as well, in which protest sparked the harshest of crackdowns and even the threat of civil war. The cases of Bahrain and Libya serve as cautionary tales, especially in countries deeply divided along sectarian and tribal lines—and these cases are likely to rein in the otherwise euphoric contagion of the Tunisian example.

Related to these considerations is the character of the military in any given country and its investment in regime survival. In many Arab countries, the military leadership is linked to the ruling elite either by blood or by marriage. In others it is seriously enmeshed in economic ties to the regime. In all such cases, the military is deeply invested in regime survival. Consequently, when faced with the decision to shoot or defect, the military in these countries will be more likely to shoot. This is especially true where the military is divided from the general population along sectarian or tribal lines. Historically, we have seen evidence of the military’s willingness to massacre in situations as diverse as Syria and Algeria, and most recently in Bahrain. In such situations, a sense of impunity will be absent, and any potential snowball effect on mobilization will be constrained. Even more significantly, with the military unwilling to defect, the ruler will not be forced to flee.

Finally, social media may prove less effective in other countries in enabling activists to evade state control. Regimes learn from past mistakes, and there are ingenious ways in which authoritarian governments can use new social media to track and undermine opposition figures. Most clumsily, authoritarian regimes can shut down social media for short periods of time in order to stop the contagion of protest. But of all the tactics likely to inhibit mobilization, this is the one least likely to be effective. People have proven surprisingly nimble in evading state control of social media, in part by exploiting the diversity of media available to them. For example, when the Egyptian regime took the unprecedented step of shutting down the Internet at the height of the protests, Egyptians learned of the location of new protests by relying on live feeds submitted by cell phone to Al Jazeera Television. These feeds were then broadcast in cafés throughout the country.

Other links:

• http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/world/africa/15tunis.html?pagewanted=all
• http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/world/middleeast/01egypt.html?pagewanted=all